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In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model for stock market liquidity and its impact on asset prices
when constant market presence is costly.  We show that even when agents' trading needs are perfectly
matched, costly market presence prevents them from synchronizing their trades and hence gives rise
to endogenous order imbalances and the need for liquidity.  Moreover, the endogenous liquidity need,
when it occurs, is characterized by excessive selling of significant magnitudes.  Such liquidity-driven
selling leads to market crashes in the absence of any aggregate shocks.  Finally, we show that illiquidity
in the market leads to high expected returns, negative and asymmetric return serial correlation, and
a positive relation between trading volume and future returns.  We also propose new measures of liquidity
based on its asymmetric impact on prices and demonstrate a negative relation between these measures
and expected stock returns.
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Market crashes refer to large, sudden drops in asset prices in the absence of big news on the
fundamentals, such as future payo®s. Crashes exhibit several distinct features: They are one-
sided|market surges are less likely; they are typically accompanied by large selling pressures
in the market; and while the drop in prices occurs quickly, the recovery is slow. The extent
literature provides no clear consensus on what causes a crash. The lack of liquidity, however,
is always identi¯ed as its symptom and is blamed for exacerbating its consequences.1
This view is supported by increasing evidence that despite the pro¯table buying opportu-
nities after a crash|at least as perceived by some observers|new capital °ows in only after
long lags. For example, following the 1987 stock market crash, a large number of companies
announced repurchases of their own shares, re°ecting the belief that their stocks were under-
valued; however, these announcements were spread over many months and took even longer
to be implemented.2 Similarly, following the LTCM episode in 1998, the substantial capital
out°ows from hedge funds operating in the same markets as LTCM (e.g., ¯xed income arbi-
trage and global macro strategies) only started to reverse several quarters later, despite the
opportunities in these markets.3 This evidence suggests that capital movements are costly.
The costs range from informational costs to institutional rigidities (see, e.g., Merton (1987)
among others). When abnormal trading pressure hits, only a limited supply of liquidity is
available to accommodate the trades and hence prices have to shift drastically.
This perspective focuses on the lack of liquidity supply, especially during market crises.
But it does not explain what gives rise to the initial need for liquidity, why it is usually in the
form of excessive selling, and why it is of large magnitudes. In this paper, we show that the
same cost that hinders the ex post supply of liquidity also generates the need for liquidity in
the ¯rst place. Despite the symmetric nature intrinsic to market participants' idiosyncratic
trading needs, the aggregate need for liquidity, when it arises, is asymmetric (usually on the
selling side) and of large size. With limited supply of liquidity in the market, these sudden
1For example, the report by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS (1999)) provides an
overview of the \¢¢¢ deterioration in liquidity and elevation of risk spreads ¢¢¢" in many international ¯nancial
markets in autumn 1998.
2Earlier analysis of the share repurchases after 1987 crash include Gammill and Marsh (1988) and Netter
and Mitchell (1989). More recent studies of ¯rms' share repurchase behavior include Ikenberry, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen (1995), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and Dittmar (2000).
3See, e.g., Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) and Tremont (2006). We thank Cristian-Ioan Tiu and
Mila Getmansky for bringing to our attention the Tremont Asset Flows Report for data on hedge fund °ows.
1surges of endogenous liquidity needs lead to large price drops, as in market crashes.
We start with a model that captures two important aspects of liquidity, the need to trade
and the cost of trading. Trading needs arise from idiosyncratic shocks to agents' wealth, which
the agents want to unload in the market by adjusting their asset holdings. By de¯nition,
idiosyncratic shocks sum to zero at the aggregate level. As a result, agents' trading needs are
always symmetric and perfectly matched, that is, for each potential seller there is a potential
buyer with o®setting trading needs. If market presence is costless, all potential buyers and
sellers will be in the market at all times. Their trades will be perfectly synchronized and
matched, and there will be no need for liquidity. In this case, the market-clearing price always
re°ects the fundamental value of the asset, such as asset payo®s and investor preferences, and
idiosyncratic shocks generate trading but have no impact on prices.
In contrast, when market presence is costly, the need for liquidity arises endogenously and
idiosyncratic shocks can a®ect prices. Costly market presence has two important e®ects. First,
it prevents potential traders from being in the market constantly. They will enter the market
only when they are far away from their desired positions and the expected gains from trading
outweigh the cost. Infrequent trading implies that traders who are hit by idiosyncratic risks
will not always be able to unload them in the market, which makes them more risk averse.
Second, potential traders with o®setting trading needs perceive di®erent gains from trading.
In particular, the gains from trading for potential sellers are always larger than the gains
from trading for potential buyers. The reason is that, as idiosyncratic shocks push them away
from their optimal positions, traders become more risk averse and less willing to hold the
asset. This increased risk aversion reduces their preferred asset holding and exacerbates the
selling need for potential sellers and dampens the buying demand for potential buyers. The
asymmetry in their desire to trade leads to order imbalances in the form of excess supply and
the need for liquidity. The price has to decrease in response.
Moreover, the endogenous liquidity need is highly nonlinear in the idiosyncratic shocks that
drive agents' trading needs. When the magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks is moderate, gains
from trading are relatively small. As a result, all traders will stay out of the market and there
is no need for liquidity. Only when the idiosyncratic shocks are su±ciently large do gains from
trading exceed the participation cost for some potential traders. They enter the market with
large trading needs and more on the selling side. Thus, the order imbalance and the need for
liquidity, when they occur, are large in magnitude, causing the price to drop discretely in the
absence of any aggregate shocks. Such market behavior|namely, infrequent but large price
2drops accompanied by large selling pressure absent big news on the fundamentals|clearly
resembles the features of market crashes.
This mechanism for crashes, driven solely by liquidity, di®ers from those proposed in the
literature that rely on the presence of information asymmetry among investors about the
fundamentals.4 Our analysis shows that purely idiosyncratic and non-fundamental shocks
can cause market crashes if the capital °ow is costly. Moreover, information-based models
for crashes have two undesirable features from an empirical perspective: Both crashes and
surges are possible and a crash re°ects a permanent shift in the price instead of a transitory
price change.5 In contrast, our liquidity-based explanation for crashes predicts one-sided and
transitory price movements, that is, it is less likely to see surges and the crash represents a
deviation from fundamentals that will eventually recover.
The impact of liquidity also leads to testable implications on the behavior of prices, re-
turns, and trading volume. First, crashes caused by endogenous liquidity needs lead to extra
volatility unrelated to changes in fundamentals. They also give rise to negative skewness and
fat tails in the return distribution. Second, since the price impact of liquidity is transitory,
it leads to return reversals (i.e., negative serial correlation in returns). More importantly,
the negative and discrete nature of endogenous liquidity needs implies that return reversals
are more prominent for negative returns than for positive returns. Third, in our model trad-
ing volume is positively related to liquidity needs, and thus it is negatively correlated with
the contemporaneous return but positively correlated with the future return. Consequently,
higher volume predicts higher future returns. Fourth, the asymmetric nature of the liquidity
impact further implies that low returns accompanied by high volume exhibit stronger reversals
than high returns. Fifth, since lower returns and higher volume are indicative of aggregate
liquidity demand, they are also accompanied by higher asset volatility. In addition, given that
the level of liquidity varies across markets, our analysis also implies that the liquidity e®ects
on return and volume described above are stronger in less liquid markets.
Furthermore, we show that an asset with lower liquidity has a lower price and a higher
average return. In our model, the level of liquidity is negatively related to several observable
4For example, Grossman (1988), Gennotte and Leland (1990), and Romer (1993) consider models with
information asymmetry in incomplete markets.
5The symmetry simply comes from the fact that when information moves prices, it can be either positive or
negative. The permanent nature of the price change follows from the fact that the change re°ects additional
information about the fundamentals. Models with short-sale or borrowing constraints, such as Hong and Stein
(2003), Yuan (2005), and Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), can generate negative skewness in returns. But the
skewness arises from the asymmetric distribution of small price changes, not discrete price drops.
3variables such as the average volume and the price impact measures of Campbell, Grossman,
and Wang (1993). Thus, our model provides an explanation for the positive relation between
the average stock return and these variables, which have been documented in several empirical
studies (see, e.g., Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003)). In addition, several studies ¯nd that various trading cost measures are at best noisy
proxies of liquidity in explaining returns (see, e.g., Hasbrouck (2006) and Spiegel and Wang
(2007)). Based on the asymmetric nature of liquidity's price impact, we propose more direct
measures of liquidity, such as the asymmetry in the return serial correlation between high and
low returns or between returns accompanied by high and low volume. The model predicts a
positive link between expected returns and these liquidity measures.
In studying the impact of liquidity, much of the attention has focused on the supply of
liquidity, taking the liquidity demand as given.6 For example, Grossman and Miller (1988)
consider how participation costs limit market makers' supply of liquidity and reduce price
volatility, taking as given the non-synchronization in trades. Pagano (1989) and Allen and
Gale (1994) consider the ex-ante participation decisions of agents with di®erent future liquidity
needs. They show that the ex-ante optimal level of participation can be inadequate ex-post
when the realized liquidity need is very large, causing additional volatility in prices.
We extend the existing literature on liquidity by modeling how the need for liquidity arises
endogenously and how it behaves. Our analysis shows that it is the participation costs that
generate the non-synchronization in trades and hence the need for liquidity in the ¯rst place.
We capture the dynamic aspect of liquidity by allowing traders to make their participation
decisions after observing their trading needs. The endogenously derived liquidity needs exhibit
distinctive properties|in particular, one-sided and fat-tailed|which allow us to show that
liquidity needs can lead to market crashes in the absence of fundamental news.
Furthermore, in our model liquidity needs arise purely from idiosyncratic shocks, which
would have no pricing implication in the absence of the liquidity e®ect. Most of the existing
models rely on aggregate shifts in demand.7 The presence of aggregate shocks makes market
crashes and surges equally likely, as they can be either positive or negative. Moreover, it
blurs the distinction between the e®ects of liquidity and risk (and/or preferences). In these
6See, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), and Huang (2003). In the market mi-
crostructure literature, which has liquidity as a central focus, the need for liquidity, as described by the order
°ow process, is often taken as given. See, for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and Stoll
(1985). Admati and P°eiderer (1988) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995), however, do allow the order
°ow process to be in°uenced by equilibrium.
7See, e.g., Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), Campbell and Kyle (1993), and Allen and Gale (1994).
4models, liquidity merely plays the role of exacerbating the impact of exogenous aggregate
shocks. In our model, it is the idiosyncratic shock that generates endogenous selling demand
at the aggregate level.
Our model is closely related to the model of Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004), which
is in a continuous-time stationary setting. They show that gains from trading are in general
asymmetric between traders with o®setting shocks when trading is costly. In order to focus on
the impact of trading cost on price levels, they avoid potential order imbalances by allocating
the cost endogenously among buyers and sellers so that their orders are always synchronized.
As we show in this paper, it is the order imbalances that lead to liquidity needs and the
instability in asset prices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 solves for
the intertemporal equilibrium of the economy. In Section 4, we examine how the endogenous
need for liquidity a®ects asset prices, in particular, causes market crashes. In Section 5, we
explore in more detail the testable implications of our model on the impact of liquidity on the
behavior of returns and volume. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 The Model
We construct a parsimonious model that captures two important factors in analyzing liquidity,




A stock is traded in a competitive asset market. It yields a risky dividend Dt at time t, where
t = 0;1;2;::: Dividends are i.i.d. normally distributed with a mean of ¹ D and volatility of ¾D.
Let Pt denote the ex-dividend stock price at time t. In addition, there is a short-term riskless
bond, which yields a constant interest rate of r > 0 per period.
B Agents
At t = 0;1;2;:::, a set of agents are born who live for one period. Agents born at t are
referred to as generation t. They are born with initial wealth Wt, which they invest in the
stock and the bond. They sell all their assets for consumption at time t + 1.
5Each generation consists of two types of agents who face di®erent endowments and trading
costs. As described below, agents' heterogeneity in endowments gives rise to their trading
needs in our model. The ¯rst type of agents, denoted by m, are \market makers." They have
no inherent trading needs, but are present in the market at all times, ready to trade with
others. The second type of agents are \traders," who have trading needs. Traders are split
between two equal subgroups with di®erent trading needs, denoted by a and b, respectively.
The population weights of the market makers and the traders are ¹ and 2º, respectively.
The per capita supply of the stock is ¹ µ, which is positive (i.e., ¹ µ > 0). In addition, each
agent i of generation t receives a non-traded payo® Ni




iZ nt+1; i = m;a;b; (1)
where Z and nt+1 are mutually independent, normal random variables with a mean of zero
and a volatility of ¾Z and ¾n, respectively, and ¸i is a binomial random variable drawn
independently for each agent within his group, where8
¸






1; with probability ¸
0; with probability 1 ¡ ¸:
(2)
Thus, market makers receive no non-traded payo®, while a fraction ¸ of traders within each
trader group receives non-traded payo®s. Since ¸a = ¡¸b, the two groups of traders receive





t+1 = 0: (3)
The non-traded payo® is assumed to be correlated with the stock dividend Dt+1. In particular,
we let nt+1 = Dt+1 ¡ ¹ D.9
In the absence of risks from non-traded payo®s, all agents are identical and there is no
need to trade among them. However, in the presence of non-traded risks, traders who receive
them want to trade in order to share these risks. In particular, given the correlation between
the non-traded payo® and the stock payo®, they want to adjust their stock positions in order
to hedge their non-traded risks. Thus, traders' idiosyncratic risk exposures give rise to their
inherent trading needs.
8Since our analysis focuses only on generation t, we omit the time subscript for brevity whenever there is
little room for confusion, for example, ¸i and Z have no time subscript.
9We only need the correlation between nt+1 and Dt+1 to be non-zero. The qualitative nature of our results
are independent of the sign and the magnitude of the correlation. To ¯x ideas, we set it to one.
6Since the non-traded risks sum to zero as in (3), the traders' underlying trading needs
are perfectly matched. If all traders are present in the market at all times, a seller is always
matched with a buyer and there is perfect synchronization in their trades. If, however, only
some traders are present at a given time, trades may not be always synchronized and the need
for liquidity may arise.
For tractability, we assume that all agents have a utility function of constant absolute risk







; i = a;b;m; (4)
where W i
t+1 denotes agent i's terminal wealth.
Given agents' non-traded payo® and utility function, we need the following condition to






Z < 1: (5)
C Participation Costs
All agents can trade in the market at no cost at the beginning and the end of their life-span.
That is, agents of generation t can trade in the market at t and t+1 without cost. In addition,
market makers can also trade at no cost at any time between t and t+1. The traders, however,
face a ¯xed cost c ¸ 0 if they want to trade between t and t + 1.
D Time Line
We now describe in detail the timing of events and actions. At t, agents of generation t are
born. They purchase shares of the stock from the old generation and construct their optimal
portfolio µi
t, i = a;b;m. Market equilibrium at t determines Pt.
After t, traders learn if they will be exposed to any idiosyncratic risks (i.e., their draws of
¸i). Those subject to such risks (¸i6=0) also observe a signal S about the potential magnitude
of the risk, Z, that is,
S = Z + u; (6)
where u is the noise in the signal, normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of
¾2
u > 0. For future convenience, we denote by X the expectation of Z conditional on signal S
7and ¾2
z the conditional variance. We then have

















Under normality, X is a su±cient statistic for signal S. Thus, we will use X to denote these
traders' information about the magnitude of their idiosyncratic risks.
In addition, agents also receive a signal SD about the next-period dividend payment:
SD = Dt+1 + e; (8)
where e is the signal noise with a mean of zero and a variance of ¾2
e. For convenience, we set
¾e = ¾D so that half of the uncertainty about Dt+1 is resolved at t + 1/2.
After learning about their idiosyncratic risks, traders face the choice of staying out of the
market (until their terminal date) or paying a cost c to enter the market. Those who choose
to enter will then trade among themselves as well as with market makers. To ¯x ideas, we
assume that signal X and entry decisions occur at t + 1 /2, and that trading occurs right after.
A trader's choice to enter the market depends on his draw of ¸i and the signal X on the
magnitude of the idiosyncratic risk if ¸i 6= 0. Let ´i be the discrete choice variable of trader
i (i = a;b) for whether to enter the market, where ´i = 1 denotes entry and ´i = 0 denotes
no entry. Among group i traders (i = a;b) who receive idiosyncratic shocks (i.e., ¸i 6= 0),
we use !i;L to denote the fraction of traders who choose to enter the market. Similarly, !i;NL
denotes the fraction of traders without idiosyncratic shocks who choose to enter. We also use
µi
t+1 /2(´i) to denote the number of stock shares agents i (i = m;a;b) hold after trading at date
t + 1 /2. Of course, µi
t+1 /2(´i=0) = µi
t. Summarizing the description above, Figure 1 illustrates
the time-line of the economy.
-
t t + 1/2 t + 1 time





Equilibrium Pt !i;L;!i;NL; Pt+1 /2 Pt+1 ¢¢¢
Figure 1: The time line of the economy.










tRF (Pt+1 /2 ¡ RFPt) + µ
i
t+1 /2(´
i)(Dt+1 + Pt+1 ¡ RFPt+1 /2); (9)
8where RF = (1 + r)1=2 is the gross interest rate for each half-period, ci = c for i = a;b, and









t+1 is the income from the non-traded asset in (1).
2.2 Discussions and Simpli¯cations
In this subsection, we provide additional discussions on several aspects of the model. A key
ingredient of our model is the cost to participate in the market. The cost is intended to capture
frictions that prevent either the full participation of all potential players in a market or the
instant capital °ow to a market. Information costs and institutional rigidities are abundant.
Gathering and processing information, devising trading strategies and their support systems
in response to new information, raising capital, and making changes in business practice to
implement these strategies all involve costs and time. After an extensive discussion on the
importance of these costs, Merton (1987) observes that \On the time scale of trading oppor-
tunities, the capital stock of dealers, market makers and traders is essentially ¯xed. Entry
into the dealer business is neither costless nor instantaneous."10 While direct measurements
of participation costs are hard, there is increasing evidence demonstrating their signi¯cance
(see, for example, Coval and Sta®ord (2007) and Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)).11
Our model also makes an important technical assumption that, at the time of participation
decisions, traders only partially learn about their future idiosyncratic risks, i.e., they receive
a noisy signal S about Z. If Z is fully known at the time of the participation decision, a
single trade can remove all future non-traded risks, and the model becomes essentially static.
By assuming a partial observation of Z, we capture the intertemporal e®ect that a trader,
even when he chooses to enter the market now, still expects to bear some idiosyncratic risk
since he may not be in the market in the future. Such an expectation in°uences his current
participation decision. As we will see in the next section, this remaining uncertainty leads
to asymmetric participation decisions for traders with matching trading needs. Thus, this
10See also Brennan (1975), Hirshleifer (1988), Leland and Rubinstein (1988), Chatterjee and Corbae (1992),
and Gromb and Vayanos (2002), among others, for more discussion of participation costs in ¯nancial markets.
11The evidence on the limited mobility of capital is quite extensive. See also Harris and Gurel (1986),
Shleifer (1986), Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), and Chen, Noronha, and
Singal (2004) on the price e®ect of stock deletions from the S&P index, Frazzini and Lamont (2007) on the
price impact of capital °ows to mutual funds, and Tremont (2006) on market behavior and hedge fund °ows.
9result arises from the intertemporal nature of the model. In a fully intertemporal setting,
Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) show that when participation costs force traders to trade
infrequently, they always expect to bear some idiosyncratic risks and the asymmetry in their
trading is a general outcome. Our setup provides a simple way to capture the same e®ect.
As long as it occurs after the participation decision, the exact timing of the full revelation
of Z is not critical. For simplicity, we assume that by the time of trading (right after t + 1 /2)
all traders who receive idiosyncratic risks also observe the realization of Z.12
2.3 Equilibrium with Costless Participation
Before solving for the equilibrium, we describe the special case of participation costs being zero
for all agents. This case serves as a benchmark when we examine the impact of participation
costs on liquidity and stock prices. At zero cost, all traders and market makers will be in the
market at all times.
At any time t, we de¯ne the conditional mean and variance of the stock's future payo®,


















where Et[¢] and Vart[¢] denote the expectation and variance conditional on the information at
time t. The equilibrium price and agents' equilibrium stock holdings are given by
Pt = Ft ¡ ®¾2
t ¹ µ; µi
t = ¹ µ
Pt+1 /2 = Ft+1 /2 ¡ ®¾2
t+1 /2¹ µ; µi
t+1 /2 = ¹ µ ¡ ¸iZ;
(12)
where t = 0;1;2;::: and i = a;b;m.
In this case, the stock price Ps is determined by the stock's expected future dividends
Fs, the dividend risk ¾2
s, and the aggregate (per capita) risk exposure ¹ µ. We call these the
\fundamentals." Prices do not depend on the idiosyncratic risk Z. For traders exposed to
non-traded risks, their stock holdings equal the per capita endowment ¹ µ plus an additional
component ¸iZ, which re°ects the traders' hedging demand to o®set the exposure to the non-
traded risk. It is important to note that because these traders' underlying trading needs are
perfectly matched (¸a = ¡¸b), so are their trades when they are all in the market. In this
12We also solve the model under the assumption that Z is revealed at t + 1. The equilibrium price and
participation decisions are qualitatively the same, except that there is an extra risk premium for the unhedged
risk even under full participation. Since our focus is on the price di®erence between the full and the partial
participation equilibrium, we choose the current setup to have a simpler full participation benchmark.
10case, the market is perfectly liquid in the sense that order °ows have no price impact. There
is no need for liquidity and market makers perform no role (their holdings stay at µm = ¹ µ).
3 Equilibrium
We now solve for the equilibrium with costly participation as follows. First, taking the stock
price at t + 1, agents' initial stock holdings, and participation decisions as given, we solve for
the stock market equilibrium at t + 1 /2. Second, we solve for individual agents' participation
decisions and the participation equilibrium, given the market equilibrium at t + 1 /2 and the
agents' initial stock holdings at t. Finally, we solve for the market equilibrium at time t, and
use the condition Pt+1 = Pt to obtain the full stationary equilibrium of the economy.
In the ¯rst two steps (Sections 3.1 to 3.3), we assume that traders who receive no id-
iosyncratic shocks (¸i = 0) stay out of the market until the end of their horizon, that is,
!i;NL = 0, i = a;b. Thus, we consider only those traders who receive shocks and solve for their
participation decisions, the participation equilibrium, and the market equilibrium at t + 1 /2.
In these subsections, unless stated otherwise, traders refer only to those with ¸i 6= 0, and
!a ´ !a;L and !b ´ !b;L refer to fractions of the traders that choose to participate. In the
last step (Section 3.4), we include all traders and con¯rm that, indeed, in equilibrium those
who receive no idiosyncratic shocks choose not to participate in the market.
3.1 Market Equilibrium at t + 1/2
At t + 1 /2, we take agents' initial stock holdings and their participation decisions as given
and solve for the market equilibrium. Let µ ´ (µa
t;µb
t;µm
t ) denote agents' stock holdings at t
and ! ´ (!a;!b) denote the participation decision. Together with the idiosyncratic shock Z,
fµ;!g de¯nes the state of the economy at t + 1 /2. Two variables are of particular importance










where ^ µ gives the per capita stock supply in the market (brought in by participating agents)
and ± measures the di®erence in participation between the two trader groups. Since the
participation equilibrium at t depends on the information X about the non-traded risk, !a
and !b, and thus ^ µ and ±, are all functions of X.
The following proposition solves the market equilibrium at t + 1 /2.
11Proposition 1. Let Pt+1 be the equilibrium price at time t + 1. Given the market condition
^ µ and ±, the equilibrium stock price at t + 1 /2 is




Et+1 /2[Dt+1] + Pt+1 ¡ 1
2®¾
2






and the equilibrium stock holding of participating agent i is
µ
i
t+1 /2 = ^ µ + ±Z ¡ ¸
iZ; i = a;b;m: (15)
When ± = 0, the participation of the two groups of traders is symmetric. The participating
agents' holdings are equal to the per capita holding ^ µ minus the hedging demand ¸iZ. Since
¸a = ¡¸b, there is a perfect match between the buy and sell orders among traders, and the
equilibrium price is not a®ected by the idiosyncratic shock Z. This situation is reminiscent of
the benchmark case when participation is costless.
When ± 6= 0, the participation of the two groups of traders is asymmetric. The quantity
±Z measures the excess exposure (per capita) to the non-traded risk due to the asymmetric
participation of traders. In this case, the optimal holding in (15) has an extra term ±Z for all
participating agents since they equally share this additional source of risk. The idiosyncratic
shock Z now a®ects the equilibrium price. Thus, in our model, even though traders face
o®setting shocks, asymmetry in their participation can give rise to a mismatch in their trades
and cause the price to change in response to these shocks.
Here, we have taken traders' participation and the resulting ± and ^ µ as given. In the follow-
ing subsections, we show that when individual participation decisions are made endogenously,
asymmetric participation occurs as an equilibrium outcome.
3.2 Optimal Participation Decision
Given the market equilibrium at t+1 /2 and the signal X for future idiosyncratic shocks, we now
solve the optimal participation policy of an individual trader, taking as given the participation
decision of others. In the next subsection, we ¯nd the competitive equilibrium for traders'
participation decisions.
For trader i, let JP and JNP denote his utility from participation and no participation,
respectively. In general, trader i's utility depends on his initial stock holding µi, his exposure
to the non-traded risk given by ¸i and X, and the market condition given by ^ µ and ±. His net
12gain from participation can be de¯ned as the certainty equivalence gain in wealth:
g(µ
i;¸







The minus sign on the right-hand side adjusts for the fact that JP(¢) and JNP(¢) are negative.
The following proposition describes the optimal participation policy for an individual trader.
Proposition 2. For trader i with initial stock holding µi, idiosyncratic shock ¸i 6= 0 and X,
and market condition ^ µ and ±, his net gain from participation is13
g(µ
i;¸
i;X; ^ µ;±) = g1(µ
i;¸





































The trader chooses to participate if and only if g(¢) > 0.
The ¯rst term of the gain, g1(¢), represents the expected gain from trading given the current
signal X on non-traded risks. This term depends on trader i's initial holding µi, the per
capita stock supply of all participating agents ^ µ, and the expected idiosyncratic risk, ¸iX.
The second term, g2(¢), captures the expected gain from trading to o®set future shocks to
non-traded risks. This term depends on the market condition ± and the quantity k, which
depends on ¾z in (7) and captures the variation in future trading needs. The last term, ¡RFci,
simply re°ects the cost of participation.
The gain is always positive when the participation cost is small, i.e., when c · R¡1
F g2(¢).
Trader i always participates in this case, independent of X. The more interesting case is when
c > R¡1
F g2(¢) and trader i chooses to participate only if the expected gain g1(¢) from trading
against his current expected exposure is su±ciently large. Note that g1(¢) is zero when his
current holding µi is equal to ^ µi. Thus, we can interpret ^ µi as trader i's desired stock holding
after observing his idiosyncratic risk. In this case, a trader chooses to participate when his
holding µi is su±ciently far away from the desired position ^ µi.
Gains from participation depend on traders' initial stock holding µi. When ¸ is small, we
13The gain from participation for those with ¸i = 0 is di®erent and is given in the Appendix.
13expect that in equilibrium µi (i = a;b) and µm are not too far apart and both are close to
¹ µ, the per capita supply of stock. Thus, for the discussion to follow we will assume that this











; i = a;b: (20)
We verify later that this condition is indeed satis¯ed in equilibrium (see Theorem 1).
From the expressions in Proposition 2, it is obvious that the gains from trading are not
symmetric between the two trader groups (with ¸a 6= ¸b). To understand the intuition, we
consider the simple situation in which the market participation rate is symmetric (± = 0) and
show that the gains from trading is not symmetric even in this case. Note that when ± = 0,
g2(¢) and ci are identical for both trader groups, and g1(¢) reduces to the following:
g1(µ
i;¸






i ¡ (1¡k)^ µ + ¸
iX
i2
; i = a;b: (21)
Under (20), we have µi > (1¡k)^ µ. Thus, the trading gain is always higher for the group with
¸iX > 0 (potential sellers) than for the group with ¸iX < 0 (potential buyers).
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Figure 2: Traders' desired risk exposure before and after idiosyncratic shocks.
Figure 2 illustrates the asymmetric trading gains between the buyers and the sellers. We
plot the case in which ¸iX > 0. The solid lines correspond to traders' desired stock holding
before and after their idiosyncratic shocks. A trader i starts with an initial holding µi, which
is optimal before receiving any idiosyncratic shock. After learning that he will receive a shock
(¸i 6= 0), the trader's preferred stock exposure changes to (1¡k) ^ µ, which is only (1¡k) share
14of the per capita stock supply in the market, and clearly lower than his initial holding µi. This
change in the desired risk exposure is independent of the actual sign or the magnitude of the
shock X. Thus, conditional on the idiosyncratic shock, potential sellers who have received
additional positive exposure via the non-traded risk (i.e., ¸iX > 0) is further away from their
optimal holding than potential buyers are. As a result, the gains from trading is higher for
the potential sellers.
The reason traders prefer a lower risk exposure upon receiving the idiosyncratic shock is
that the cost of participation prevents the trader from trading in the market at all times. As
a result, the trader expects to bear some of the idiosyncratic risk Z. This extra risk e®ectively
reduces his risk tolerance and lowers his desired stock exposure relative to market makers, who
face no cost and can always trade.14 The percentage reduction in the trader's desired position,
captured by k, is proportional to the level of the remaining uncertainty in his idiosyncratic
risk exposure.
In summary, the main intuition behind the asymmetric trading gains is as follows. Since
traders choose their initial holdings before they learn whether or not they will receive idiosyn-
cratic shocks, they rationally choose a high initial holding if they expect a low probability
of ever receiving a shock. However, once they are hit with shocks, their initial holding level
becomes too high given the possibility of bearing some unhedged risk. Irrespective of the sign
of his idiosyncratic shock, he prefers to decrease his stock exposure. Obviously, potential sell-
ers who have received additional positive exposure are further away from the desired holding
level than are potential buyers. As a result, sellers enjoy larger gains from trading.15
3.3 Participation Equilibrium
Intuitively, the asymmetry in gains from trading will lead to asymmetric participation be-
tween the traders. In particular, since potential sellers always have higher gains from trading
than potential buyers in our setting, we further expect that sellers are more likely to partic-
ipate in the market than buyers. We con¯rm this intuition by considering the participation
equilibrium.
In order to solve for the equilibrium !a and !b, we substitute the expression of ^ µ and ±
14The result that traders become e®ectively more risk averse with unhedged idiosyncratic risks is clearly
preference dependent. Kimball (1993) shows that it is true for \standard risk aversion," which is de¯ned as a
class of utility function that exhibits both DARA and decreasing absolute prudence.
15In a setting similar to ours, Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) show that even in continuous time the gain
from trading is asymmetric around the optimal holding due to the fact that traders only trade infrequently.
15in (13) into the de¯nition of g(¢) and de¯ne a function of participation gain for group-a and











b;X; ^ µ;±): (22)
The following proposition describes the participation equilibrium.







0; if ga(0;0) · 0







0; if gb(1;0) · 0
1; if gb(1;1) ¸ 0
sb; otherwise;
where sa and sb are the solutions to ga(sa;0) = 0 and gb(1;sb) = 0, respectively. For X > 0,
the equilibrium is fully speci¯ed as follows:
A. For ga(1; ^ sb) ¸ 0, !a = 1 and !b = ^ sb.
B. For ga(1; ^ sb) < 0 and gb(^ sa;0) · 0, !a = ^ sa and !b = 0.
C. Otherwise, !a;!b 2 (0; 1) and satisfy both ga(!a;!b) = 0 and gb(!a;!b) = 0.
Moreover, !a ¸ !b. For X < 0, the equilibrium is given by exchanging subscripts a and b.
Cases A and B describe two polar cases when we have corner solutions, either all potential
sellers participate (Case A) or no buyers do (Case B). Case A corresponds to the situation
in which trading gains for sellers are overwhelming so that they will all enter the market,
irrespective of what buyers do. The presence of a large number of sellers increases the trading
gain for buyers. Thus, in this case some buyers may also choose to participate. Case B
corresponds to the situation in which not all sellers will participate but independent of what
they do the net trading gains for buyers remains negative. In this case, some sellers choose
to participate but no buyers do. Case C corresponds to the intermediate case when we have
a partial interior solution. In this case, participation of each group depends on the degree of
participation of the other group.
Proposition 3 con¯rms that there are always more sellers entering the market than buyers
in equilibrium, generating an excess sell order in the market and the need for liquidity. Market
makers provide the necessary liquidity in equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium participation decisions as functions of the idiosyncratic
shock X. Panel (a) reports the fraction !i of traders within group i who choose to participate.
16(a) Participation Rate !a and !b (b) Di®erence in Participation Rate ±
















Figure 3: Equilibrium participation. The ¯gure plots the equilibrium participation rate for the
two trader groups for di®erent values of idiosyncratic shock X. Panel (a) reports the equilibrium
fraction of group i traders who choose to participate, where the dotted and the dashed lines refer
to group a and b traders, respectively. Panel (b) reports the di®erence in participation decisions,
± = ¸º(!a¡!b)=[¹+¸º(!a+!b)]. Other parameters are set at the following values: ¹ µ = 1, ® = 4,
r = 0:05, ¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09, ¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 1, º = 5, and ¸ = 0:15.
The dotted line plots !a and the dashed line plots !b. Panel (b) reports the di®erence in
participation ratio between the two groups of traders ±, de¯ned in equation (13). When X > 0,
group-a traders are potential sellers and group-b traders are potential buyers. Consistent with
our earlier intuition, more sellers are participating than buyers as !a is always above !b in
this region. In particular, when X is not too far from zero, !a > 0 and !b = 0, that is, no
group-b traders choose to participate because the bene¯t from trading is too small, and only
a fraction of group-a traders participates. This corresponds to Case B in Proposition 3. As
X increases, the gains from trading increases for both groups and both !a and !b increase.
In particular, for medium levels of X, !b becomes positive and !a reaches one. That is, the
gain from trading dominates the cost for group-a traders and they all choose to participate.
This corresponds to Case A in Proposition 3. When X < 0, group-a traders become potential
buyers and group-b traders become potential sellers. The above results remain the same after
we switch subscript a and b. In fact, !b is simply the mirror image of !a around the vertical
axis, re°ecting the fact that traders a and b face opposite idiosyncratic shocks. Neither !a
nor !b is symmetric around zero, consistent with the fact that a trader's gain from trading is
asymmetric between positive and negative idiosyncratic shocks.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that the normalized di®erence between !a and !b is always
positive when X > 0, indicating that more group-a traders are participating. Since they are
potential sellers when X > 0, the aggregate order imbalance is skewed towards sell orders.
Similarly, when X < 0, ± is always negative, indicating more group-b traders are participating.
Since group-b traders are potential sellers when X < 0, the order imbalance is again skewed
towards sell orders.
173.4 Full Equilibrium of the Economy
We now solve the full equilibrium of the economy. We start by computing the value function
for all agents at time t, including traders who receive no idiosyncratic risks. For trader i = a;b,
his indirect utility function, JP or JNP, depends on his own ¸i and X, given his initial stock
holding µi













































where ^ µ and ± are de¯ned in (13), which depend on the equilibrium participation ratio !a and
!b in Proposition 3 and thus are are functions of X (and µt), and E[¢] denotes expectation
over X.16 The ex-ante utility of any trader before receiving any information on idiosyncratic












t;µt); i = a;b: (25)
















To solve for the full equilibrium of the economy, we ¯rst take Pt+1 as given to derive the
equilibrium price Pt and stock holding µt from the following market clearing condition:
¹ µ
m




t) = (¹ + 2º) ¹ µ: (27)
We then we impose the stationarity condition
Pt+1 = Pt (28)
to derive the full equilibrium. In addition, we need to con¯rm that in equilibrium, traders






















The following proposition describes the condition that de¯nes the equilibrium.
16For J
NL, the expectation is taken over X before the maximization because a trader with ¸i = 0 does not
observe X and makes his participation decisions independent of the realization of X.
18Proposition 4. A stationary equilibrium of the economy is determined by the set of prices








t;µt); i = a;b;m; (30)
the market clearing condition (27), the stationarity condition (28), and that satis¯es conditions
(20) and (29).
Equation (30) is agents' ¯rst-order condition for optimal portfolio choice at t before they
receive any idiosyncratic shocks.
We can solve the equilibrium explicitly when the probability of idiosyncratic shock ¸ is
small as shown in the Appendix, which leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 1. When the probability of idiosyncratic shock ¸ is small, there exists a stationary
equilibrium as described by Proposition 4.
For arbitrary ¸, we have to solve the equilibrium numerically.
4 Endogenous Liquidity Demand and Market Crashes
The equilibrium under costly participation shows two striking features. First, despite the
fact that the two groups of traders have perfectly o®setting trading needs, their actual trades
are not synchronized. The non-synchronization in their trades gives rise to the need for
liquidity in the market. A group of traders may bring their orders to the market while
traders with o®setting trading needs are absent, creating an imbalance of orders. The stock
price adjusts in response to the order imbalance to induce market makers to provide liquidity
and to accommodate the orders. As a result, the price of the stock depends not only on the
fundamentals (i.e., its expected future payo®s and total risks), but also on idiosyncratic shocks
that market participants face. Second, despite the symmetry between shocks to potential
buyers and sellers, the order imbalance observed in the market tends to be asymmetric and
on average is dominated by sell orders. Thus, the endogenous liquidity need typically takes
the form of excessive selling, which causes the price to tank. We now examine in more detail
these results and their implications.
By construction, the equilibrium stock price is stationary over time at the beginning of
each generation, Pt+1 = Pt = P. And it °uctuates during the lifespan of each generation as a
function of the idiosyncratic shocks. As (14) indicates, the intermediate price consists of two
19components: the risk-adjusted fundamental value, R¡1
F
¡










The ¯rst component re°ects the stock's \fundamental value" since it gives the stock price when
the idiosyncratic shock is zero. It is simply equal to the expected future payo®s (dividend
plus resale price) minus a risk premium. The liquidity component p, on the other hand,
captures price deviations caused by market illiquidity. It is non-zero only when agents receive
idiosyncratic shocks. Moreover, it is proportional to the per capita order imbalance, driven
by the asymmetric participation between buyers and sellers. Since our purpose here is to
understand the endogenous nature of order imbalances and its impact on asset prices, we
focus our discussion on the liquidity component p.
From (31), p depends on the di®erence in market participation rate ±, which is a function
of the signal X, and the realized idiosyncratic shock Z, which is equal to the signal X plus an
update, Z¡X » N (0;¾2
z). We can average out the update term and consider the expected
liquidity component conditional on the signal X:




(a) Conditional Liquidity (^ p) (b) Probability Distribution of ^ p (c) Probability Distribution of p


























Figure 4: The liquidity component in price p and its value ^ p conditional on signal X. Panel (a)
plots ^ p as a function of the signal X. Panel (b) plots the probability density function of ^ p, except at
the point 0 where the value corresponds to the total probability mass at the point (since the density
function should be in¯nity at this point). Other parameters are set at the following values: ¹ µ = 1,
® = 4, r = 0:05, ¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09, ¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 1, º = 5, and ¸ = 0:15.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots the conditional liquidity component ^ p as a function of X.
Recall from section 2.3 that ^ p is always zero in the absence of participation costs. Figure 4(a)
shows that ^ p is generally not zero and is always negative in the presence of costs. This
result follows directly from the asymmetric participation equilibrium obtained in Section 3.
20In particular, partial participation leads to non-synchronized trades among traders and the
need for liquidity. The stock price has to adjust to attract the market makers to provide the
liquidity and accommodate the trades. In general, the stock price becomes dependent on the
idiosyncratic shocks of individual traders and ^ p 6= 0. Moreover, potential sellers are more
willing to enter the market to sell the stock. Thus, the average order imbalance, as captured
by ¡±X, is always negative, which leads to a negative ^ p. The fact that ^ p is independent of the
sign of X indicates that, independent of the source of idiosyncratic shocks and its distribution
among investors, costly participation always lead to an excess selling pressure in the market
and a lower stock price. In summary, we have the following result:
Result 1. Under costly participation, purely idiosyncratic trading needs can lead to aggregate
demand for liquidity, which always takes the form of excess selling and causes asset prices to
drop.
The magnitude of ^ p depends on the size of X. From Figure 4(a), we further observe that
^ p is highly non-linear in X. In particular, for small values of X, gains from trading are small
for all traders and they do not enter the market. As a result, there is no need for liquidity
and the price impact of liquidity is equal to zero. For very large values of X, gains from
trading are su±ciently large for all traders and they all enter the market. There is no need
for liquidity and ^ p is also equal to zero. For intermediate ranges of X, the gains from trading
are large enough for some traders to enter the market, but not for all traders to do so. It is in
this case that trades are non-synchronized and liquidity is needed in the market, which will
in turn a®ect the stock price. As Figure 4(a) shows, the price impact of liquidity reaches the
maximum for a certain magnitude of the idiosyncratic shock.
The result that the price impact of liquidity need is one-sided and highly non-linear arises
from the fact that liquidity needs are endogenous in our model. In most of the existing mod-
els of liquidity, such as that in Grossman and Miller (1988), liquidity needs are exogenously
speci¯ed; consequently, its price impact is linear in the exogenous liquidity needs and sym-
metrically distributed. Our analysis shows that modeling the liquidity needs endogenously is
important for understanding their behavior and impact on prices. After all, it is the same
economic force, namely, the cost to participate in the market, that drives both the liquidity
needs of the traders and the liquidity provision of market makers.
The non-linearity in the price impact of liquidity leads to another interesting result: large
but infrequent price movements in the absence of any aggregate shocks. Figure 4(b) plots
the probability distribution of ^ p. When participation is costless, there is no liquidity e®ect
21and the distribution is simply a delta function at zero. When traders face costs to participate
in the market, however, the stock price becomes dependent on the idiosyncratic shock X.
Moreover, even though the underlying idiosyncratic shocks that drive the individual traders'
trading needs are normally distributed, their price impact ^ p as depicted in Figure 4(a) is
always negative and highly no-linear in X. In particular, its distribution peaks at a ¯nite
and negative value. Since such a price movement is caused by a large imbalance in trades,
endogenously risen from idiosyncratic shocks, it represents a market crash driven purely by
liquidity needs. We call it a \liquidity crash." We summarize this results as follows:
Result 2. The impact of liquidity can lead to \liquidity crashes" in which large price drops
occur in the absence of any shocks to the fundamentals.
The above discussion focuses on ^ p, which gives the expected impact of liquidity need on
the stock price conditional on X, the signal on future idiosyncratic shocks. The actual price
at t + 1 /2, as given in (31), will depend on Z, the actual realization of idiosyncratic shock,
and the signal SD on future dividends. Although the behavior of p is qualitatively similar
to that of ^ p, its distribution is slightly di®erent due to the additional shocks. Figure 4(c)
plots the unconditional distribution of p. From Figure 4(c), we observe that p, the liquidity
component of price, exhibits negative skewness and fat tails. In the absence of liquidity e®ects,
its distribution will simply be a delta function at zero. The total price of the stock also includes
the news on the dividend, which is normally distributed. Thus, its distribution combines the
distributions of dividend news and p, which then also exhibits negative skewness and fat tails.
Hence, we have the following result.
Result 3. The impact of liquidity can signi¯cantly increase the downside risk and lead to
negative skewness and fat tails in prices.
5 Return and Volume
The impact of liquidity also leads to testable implications about the behavior of return and
volume. In this section, we explore some of these implications. The (excess) returns on the
stock over the two relevant periods are given by
Rs = Dt+s + Pt+s ¡ RFPt+s¡1 /2; s = 1 /2; 1: (33)
22The trading volume of the stock at s = 1 /2 is given by






5.1 Return and Volume Dynamics
First, let us examine the impact of liquidity on return dynamics. In contrast to shocks to
fundamentals (i.e., cash °ows), which cause permanent changes in prices, liquidity shocks
give rise to transitory price changes. Consequently, the impact of liquidity generates negative
serial correlation in returns. This is probably the most salient feature of liquidity's in°uence
on prices, as emphasized in Ho and Stoll (1981), Grossman and Miller (1988), and Campbell,
Grossman, and Wang (1993). Our analysis of liquidity leads to additional predictions. In
particular, in our model it is the idiosyncratic shock to di®erent agents that gives rise to
the liquidity need, which leads to transitory price deviations from its fundamental value.
Moreover, the impact of liquidity on prices is more likely to be negative. We thus have the
following result:
Result 4. The impact of liquidity leads to return reversals. Moreover, negative returns exhibit
stronger reversals than positive returns.
Given a set of parameters, we can simulate the returns and trading volumes from the model
and compute their statistics. Table 1 reports several of these statistics for the benchmark
parameters. The ¯rst three columns of Panel A report the unconditional mean of volume and
returns. The fourth column of Panel A reports the value of return serial correlation, denoted
by ½ ´ Corr[R1 /2;R1]. Clearly, ½ < 0, con¯rming the ¯rst part of Result 4. The fourth column
of Panel B reports the return autocorrelation conditioning on the current return being above
and below its average, respectively. We con¯rm that the expected future return (i.e., E[R1]) is
higher and the return autocorrelation is more negative if the current return is below average.
The ¯fth column of Table 1 reports the excess volatility, which is de¯ned as the volatility
of the liquidity component p in (31) and captures the volatility of the price in excess of
the fundamental volatility. Since lower returns and higher volume are indicative of liquidity
demand, not surprisingly, we ¯nd that the excess volatility is higher in these cases. We
summarize the result as
Result 5. Volatility is higher during negative return and high volume periods.
23Table 1: Return and volume dynamics. Parameters take the following values: ¹ µ = 1, ® = 4, r = 0:05,
¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09, ¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 0:2, º = 5, and ¸ = 0:02.
Conditioning information E[V1 /2] E[R1 /2] E[R1] ½ ¾p
A. Unconditional
Unconditional 0.079 0.349 0.375 -0.023 0.045
B. Conditioning on current return
R1 /2 > E[R1 /2] 0.076 0.588 0.370 -0.012 0.043
R1 /2 < E[R1 /2] 0.081 0.110 0.381 -0.016 0.047
C. Conditioning on current volume
V1 /2 > E[V1 /2] 0.164 0.323 0.402 -0.035 0.056
V1 /2 < E[V1 /2] 0.031 0.364 0.360 -0.009 0.028
While the asymmetric relation between return and volatility is well documented in the liter-
ature, our model o®ers a liquidity-based explanation in addition to the existing alternatives
such as leverage and time-varying volatility.17
Next, we consider the joint behavior of returns and volume. In our setting, both trading
and the need for liquidity are generated by agents' idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, they are closely
related. In particular, higher trading volume also implies that the need for liquidity or the
order imbalance is more likely to be high, which is associated with lower current returns but
higher future returns. As shown in the second column of Panel C, Table 1, higher current
volume is on average accompanied by lower returns. Given return reversals, it also implies
higher future returns. The third column of Panel C con¯rms this result, while the fourth
column shows that the return reversal is also stronger for higher volume. We summarize these
¯ndings as follows.
Result 6. Higher volume implies higher future returns. Also, returns accompanied by higher
volume exhibit stronger reversals.
The negative relation between volume and return serial correlation is studied in Campbell,
Grossman, and Wang (1993). The positive relation between volume and future returns, a
17For a levered ¯rm, a negative realized return reduces its value and further increases its ¯nancial leverage,
which makes the ¯rm's equity riskier and increases its volatility. See, for example, Black (1976), Christie
(1982), and Schwert (1989). When volatility is time varying, an anticipated increase in volatility raises the
required return on equity, which causes an immediate stock price decline and a lower realized return. See, for
example, Pindyck (1984), French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), and Campbell and Hentschel (1992).
24rather surprising result, has been empirically documented by Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin
(2001). Our analysis provides a liquidity-based explanation.
Given the negative correlation between contemporaneous return and volume, both driven
by agents' endogenous liquidity needs and predictive of future returns, a natural question is
whether volume provides additional information about the magnitude of liquidity needs and
consequently future returns.
Table 2: Expected future return conditional on current returns and volume. Parameters take the following
values: ¹ µ = 1, ® = 4, r = 0:05, ¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09, ¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 0:2, º = 5, and
¸ = 0:02.
Sorted by Sorted by current volume, V1 /2
current returns, R1 /2 Low Medium High High ¡ Low
Low (25%) 0.351 0.383 0.418 0.067
Medium (50%) 0.351 0.376 0.402 0.051
High (25%) 0.350 0.368 0.388 0.038
In Table 2, we report the expected future returns for each subgroup after double-sorting
the simulated data into four-by-four subgroups based on current returns R1 /2 and volume V1 /2.
For conciseness we combine the middle two quartiles in the table. In the last column, we
report the di®erence in the average future return for the high and low volume group. Clearly,
higher volume still predicts higher future returns even after controlling for the current return.
Moreover, the predictive power of volume is stronger (the di®erence between the high and low
group is larger) for lower current returns. These ¯ndings are consistent with the empirical
results of Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006).
A simple way to describe the double conditioning results in Table 2 is to consider the
following forecasting equation, proposed by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993):
Rt+1 = a + bRt+1 /2 + cVt+1 /2Rt+1 /2 + "t+1: (35)
If we use the whole sample to estimate (35), from Result 6, c is negative, which is con¯rmed
by the more negative ½ for higher volume in the last column of Panel C, Table 1. However,
suppose that we split the sample into two according to the current return, below or above its
mean, and then run the regression for each subsample. Let c¡ and c+ denote the corresponding
coe±cients for the volume-return interaction term. Comparing the ¯rst and last rows of Table
252, we observe that c¡ is much more negative than c+.18 This result again arises from the fact
that the transitory impact of liquidity on prices is typically negative with large volume, an
important feature of our model. We summarize this result as follows:
Result 7. Negative returns accompanied by high volume exhibit stronger reversals than positive
returns.
5.2 The Cross-Section of Returns and Volume
The impact of liquidity on asset prices clearly depends on the level of liquidity available in the
market. To the extent that the level of liquidity varies across di®erent markets, its in°uence
also changes. In our model, the level of liquidity in the market is captured by ¹, the population
of market makers. Thus, in this subsection we analyze how the behavior of prices depends on
¹. The resulting implications provide a theoretical motivation to examine the di®erences in
price behavior across markets with di®erent levels of liquidity.
We ¯rst consider how the level of liquidity in°uences expected stock returns, which is
de¯ned as E[R] = E[(R1 /2 + R1)=2]. In the absence of participation costs, the market is
perfectly liquid and the expected stock return is determined only by the risk premium, which
we denote as R0. From Section 2.3, we have R0 = 1
2®¾2
D¹ µ. In the presence of participation
costs, we de¯ne the liquidity premium as
¼ = E[R] ¡ R
0: (36)
In all discussions, R0 is held constant and we use the terms liquidity premium and expected
return interchangeably.
In Figure 5(a), we plot the liquidity premium ¼ for di®erent values of ¹, the level of
liquidity in the market. Clearly, the liquidity premium decreases with ¹. Figure 5(b) plots
the average trading volume against ¹, which shows that with more market makers present,
liquidity is higher and so is trading volume.
As discussed in Section 4, in our model, non-fundamental shocks, idiosyncratic to individ-
ual agents, give rise to the endogenous liquidity need and its impact on price deviations. This
liquidity e®ect leads to more volatile and fat-tailed prices. We next examine how liquidity
in°uences the behavior of returns. In Figures 5(c) and 5(d), we report the excess volatility
and the excess kurtosis for di®erent values of ¹. We see that returns are more volatile and
18Indeed, because R1 /2 is negative for the low return group and positive for the high return group, the
coe±cient c¡ should be signi¯cantly negative while c+ should be mildly positive.
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Figure 5: Liquidity premium, trading volume, excess volatility, kurtosis, and the level of liquidity
¹. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) plot the liquidity premium, average trading volume, excess return
volatility, and excess kurtosis (which equals zero for normal distribution) as a function of ¹, respec-
tively. Other parameters are set at the following values: ¹ µ = 1, ® = 4, r = 0:05, ¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09,
¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 1, º = 5, and ¸ = 0:15.
exhibit fatter tails in less liquid markets (i.e., with lower ¹). We summarize the above results
as follows:
Result 8. Lower levels of liquidity lead to higher expected returns, more excess volatility and
fatter tails in the return distribution, but lower average trading volume.
Next, we examine how the return and volume dynamics vary with liquidity. As discussed
earlier, a general feature of the price impact of liquidity is negative serial correlation in returns.
Figure 6(a) plots the return serial correlation for di®erent values of ¹. It clearly shows that for
markets with higher levels of liquidity, there is less negative serial correlation in returns. An
important implication of our model is that return serial correlation is asymmetric, stronger for









R1 /2;R1jR1 /2 < E[R1 /2]
¤
: (37)
Result 4 states that ¢R½ is positive. Figure 6(b) further shows that the magnitude of ¢R½
27decreases with ¹. In other words, the return serial correlation becomes less symmetric, and
in particular, stronger for negative returns, in less liquid markets.
(a) Return Serial Correlation ½ (b) Asymmetry in ½ by Return (c) Asymmetry in ½ by Volume


















Figure 6: Dependence of unconditional and conditional return serial correlation on return and volume
on the level of liquidity ¹. Panel (a) plots the unconditional return serial correlation on ¹. Panel
(b) plots the di®erence in return serial correlation between positive and negative returns against
¹. Panel (c) plots the di®erence in return serial correlation between high trading volume and low
trading volume states. Other parameters are set at the following values: ¹ µ = 1, ® = 4, r = 0:05,
¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09, ¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 1, º = 5, and ¸ = 0:15.
Result 6 states that the negative return serial correlation is stronger when trading volume
is higher. We de¯ne the di®erence in the return serial correlation between low volume and








R1 /2;R1jV1 /2 ¸ E[V1 /2]
¤
: (38)
Then, ¢V½ should be positive. Figure 6(c) con¯rms the result and further shows that ¢V½ de-
creases with ¹. For markets with higher liquidity (i.e., high ¹ values), return serial correlation
diminishes and ¢V½ decreases to zero. We thus have the following result:
Result 9. Both the asymmetry in return serial correlation, as measured by ¢R½, and the
volume sensitivity of return serial correlation, as measured by ¢V½, are negatively related to
the level of liquidity in the market.
5.3 Liquidity and Expected Returns
Our analysis above, when applied to a cross-section of stocks, implies a negative relation be-
tween a stock's average return and the level of its liquidity. However, the level of liquidity ¹
is not directly observable. Many empirical studies employ di®erent proxies as measures of liq-
uidity and ¯nd that higher liquidity is generally associated with lower expected stock returns.
For example, Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) use volume as one of the liquidity
proxies and ¯nd that it has a negative correlation with average stock returns.
28In our model, both average return and volume are related to the market liquidity level as
an equilibrium outcome. As a result, they are closely related to each other. In particular, as
Figure 6(c) shows, higher volume indicates higher liquidity, which requires a lower liquidity
premium. This negative relation between volume and liquidity premium is con¯rmed in Figure
7(a).
(a) Expected return and Volume (b) Expected return and ¢R½ (c) Expected return and ¢V ½


















Figure 7: The expected return and di®erent liquidity measures. Panels (a), (b), and (c) plot the
liquidity premium (which in turn determines the expected return) against trading volume E[V ],
asymmetry in return serial correlation ¢R½, and the volume sensitivity of return serial correlation
¢V½, respectively. Other parameters are set at the following values: ¹ µ = 1, ® = 4, r = 0:05,
¹ D = 0:36, c = 0:09, ¾ D = 0:42, ¾z = 0:7, ¾u = 0:7, ¹ = 1, º = 5, and ¸ = 0:15.
Besides volume, other proxies of liquidity have also been used to explain the cross-section
of stock returns. But the results are less de¯nitive (see, for example, Hasbrouck (2006)). Since
most empirical proxies of liquidity are also related to price volatility, Spiegel and Wang (2007)
further examine the marginal contribution of these liquidity measures and idiosyncratic return
volatility in explaining returns (also see Kieschnick, Cook, and Arugaslan (2007)). They ¯nd
that the impact of idiosyncratic risk is stronger and often consumes the explanatory power of
various cost-based liquidity proxies.
Our analysis suggests new empirical measures of liquidity. In particular, Result 9 implies
that both ¢R½ and ¢V½ provide measures of liquidity. They capture a unique aspect of
liquidity, namely, its general downward pressure on prices, accompanied by high volume and
strong return reversals. Using the above measures as proxies for the level of liquidity in the
market, we expect a positive relation between them and the liquidity premium ¼. Figures
7(b) and 7(c) plot the liquidity premium ¼ for di®erent values of ¢R½ and ¢V½, respectively,
and clearly show a positive relation between ¼ and these two measures.
296 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that frictions such as costs to market presence can induce non-
synchronization in agents' trades even when their trading needs are perfectly matched. Each
trader, when arriving at the market, faces only a partial demand/supply of the asset. The mis-
match in the timing and the size of trades creates temporary order imbalances and a need for
liquidity, causing asset prices to deviate from the fundamentals. Purely idiosyncratic shocks
can a®ect prices, introducing additional price volatility. Moreover, the price deviations tend
to be highly skewed and of large size. In particular, the shortage of liquidity always causes the
price to decrease and when this happens, the price tends to drop signi¯cantly, resembling a
crash due to a sudden surge in liquidity needs. We also show that the impact of liquidity leads
to interesting implications on return and volume behavior, consistent with existing empirical
¯ndings.
A few additional comments are in order. First, our analysis takes as given the population
weight of market makers, which determines the amount of liquidity they can provide and
the equilibrium impact of liquidity needs. As Huang and Wang (2007) show, the population
weight of market makers can be endogenized. In particular, they assume that all agents can
pay either a low cost ex-ante to become a market maker or a high cost ex-post when trading
needs arise. They show that typically only a small fraction of agents will choose to become
market makes. In light of their analysis, we can interpret the relative population weight of
market makers and traders as an equilibrium outcome. Second, in our model the idiosyncratic
shocks are transitory. Thus, when a liquidity crash occurs, the stock price tanks but eventually
recovers. The possibility of such a price pattern might seem puzzling since it seems to leave
pro¯table opportunities. However, this is not so given the costs. With a small probability
for such an event to happen, it is pro¯table for only a small number of market makers to
enter the market ex-ante even if the cost for becoming a market maker is rather small. For
others, the signi¯cant cost to jump in on the spot prevents them from taking advantage of
the opportunities. Finally, in our setting, the cost to jump into the market on the spot does
impose an upper bound on the potential impact of liquidity on prices. But, this is true only
in the absence of aggregate shocks as we assumed in the model. In the presence of aggregate
shocks, the potential impact of endogenous liquidity needs on prices becomes unbounded.
30A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Given Pt+1, participating agent i maximizes his expected utility over his terminal wealth W i
t+1

























(Et+ 1 /2[Dt+1] + Pt+1 ¡ RFPt+1 /2) ¡ ¸
iZ; i = a;b;m: (A2)



























Its solution yields the equilibrium price Pt+1 /2. Using ± and ^ µ de¯ned in (13) yields the
expression of Pt+1 /2 in the proposition. The optimal holding in the proposition is obtained by
substituting the equilibrium price Pt+1 /2 back into (A2).
Proof of Proposition 2
For trader i, his (indirect) utility if he chooses to participate or not, denoted by JP and JNP,
respectively, are given by
JP(µ
i;¸






























i = 0; µ
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Substitute the equilibrium Pt+1 /2 and µi
t+1 /2 into (A1), and integrate over the distribution of Z


















31where g1(¢) and k are de¯ned in (18) and (19). Next, we calculate the value function for


















Finally, we substitute JP and JNP into (16) to derive the gains from participation. Obviously,
trader i chooses to participate in the market if and only if g(¢) > 0.
We also calculate the value function for traders with ¸i = 0. Conditional on the signal X,
the utility if they choose to participate is:
JP(¸





















If they choose not to participate, the utility is
JNP(¸
i = 0) = ¡e
¡®[R2
FWt+µi






Applying the de¯nition in (16), the gains from participation for traders with ¸i = 0 is
g(µ
i;¸

















Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 1. When traders' initial stock holdings satisfy (20), the gain from participation
ga(!a;!b) for group-a traders decreases with !a and increases with !b, while the opposite
is true for group-b traders' gain gb(!a;!b).
The proof of Lemma 1 is as follows. Given the de¯nition of g(¢) in (17), we compute its partial
derivative with respect to !a and !b. De¯ne ±i ´ ¸i± and di ´ 1¡k+k(1¡±i)2. Following
(22), let gi ´ g(µi
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@!j = ^ ¸(µ
i
t ¡ ^ µ):
32We can further simplify the expression for @gi=@!j by considering the cases of j = i and j 6= i

















From (13), ± increases in !a and decreases in !b. Hence, ± 2 [¡¹ ±; ¹ ±], where ¹ ± = ¸º
¹+¸º < 1.




























Since ±2 2 [0; ¹ ±2], (1 ¡ ±i)2 2 [0;1 + ¹ ±2], and k = 1
2®2¾2
D¾2











On the other hand, ^ µ in (13) is a weighted average of µi
t and µm
t with weights in-between zero
and one. We have
(µ
i















where the second inequality is due to condition (20). Thus, @gi=@!j > 0 for j 6= i, proving
the lemma.
Lemma 2. When traders' initial stock holdings satisfy (20), under symmetric participation,
sellers always enjoy larger gains from trading than buyers, that is, ga(!;!) ¸ gb(!;!) 8 ! 2
[0;1].






































If group-a traders are sellers and group-b are buyers, then ¸aX ¸ 0 ¸ ¸bX. Since ^ µ is the
weighted average of µi
t and µm
t , µi
t ¡ (1¡k) ^ µ ¸ µi
t ¡ (1¡k)µm
t > 0, where the last inequality
comes from (20). Hence, ga(!a;!b) ¸ gb(!a;!b) when !a = !b, which is the lemma.
33Now we prove Proposition 3. First, from Lemma 1, we know that ga(!a;0) is a monotoni-
cally decreasing function of !a. If ga(0;0) > 0 > ga(1;0), then there exists an sa 2 (0;1) that
solves ga(sa;0) = 0. Similarly, gb(1;!b) is monotonically decreasing in !b and gb(1;0) > 0 >
gb(1;1) guarantees that the solution sb 2 (0;1). Hence, ^ sa; ^ sb 2 [0;1].
We now consider the three possible cases, which are exhaustive. In Case A, there are three
subcases depending on the value of ^ sb: First, if ^ sb = 0, then gb(1;0) · 0 · ga(1;0). The
market condition !a = 1 and !b = 0 is the most favorable for buyers and the least favorable
for sellers. Yet the gain from participation is still positive for potential sellers and negative for
potential buyers. Hence, !a = 1 and !b = 0 is the solution. Second, if ^ sb = 1, then gb(1;1) ¸ 0
and Lemma 2 implies ga(1;1) ¸ 0 as well. Hence, all traders participate and !a = !b = 1.
And third, if ^ sb = sb 2 (0; 1), then gb(1; ^ sb) = 0. The condition ga(1; ^ sb) ¸ 0 con¯rms
that sellers enjoy positive gains in this case. Hence, at equilibrium participation !a = 1 and
!b = ^ sb, trader a enjoys a positive gain and trader b is indi®erent between participating or
not.
In Case B, there are only two subcases depending on the value of ^ sa. Note that ^ sa = 1
is not feasible under the condition ga(1; ^ sb) < 0, since ga(1;0) · ga(1; ^ sb) < 0 according to
Lemma 1, while ^ sa = 1 requires ga(1;0) ¸ 0. The ¯rst subcase is ^ sa = 0. Then ga(0;0) · 0.
Since gb(0;0) < ga(0;0) by Lemma 2, !a = !b = 0 is the only solution. The second subcase
is ^ sa = sa 2 (0;1), where ^ sa solves ga(^ sa;0) = 0. At ^ sa, trader a is indi®erent between
participating or not. The condition gb(^ sa;0) · 0 con¯rms that trader b does not want to
participate when !a = ^ sa. Hence, !a = ^ sa and !b = 0 in equilibrium.
In Case C, the condition is that ga(1; ^ sb) < 0 < gb(^ sa;0). Similar to Case B, the condition
ga(1; ^ sb) < 0 still rules out the possibility that ^ sa = 1. In addition, gb(^ sa;0) > 0 rules out the
possibility that ^ sb = 0, since 0 < gb(^ sa;0) < gb(1;0) by Lemma 1. Similarly, we can rule out
^ sa = 0 and ^ sb = 1. Hence, the condition in Case C reduces to ga(1;sb) < 0 < gb(sa;0). Note
that ga(sa;0) = 0 and gb(sa;0) > 0 implies that in equilibrium, !b > 0. To prove this, assume
by contradiction that !b = 0. Then at the optimal !a = sa, trader a is indi®erent while trader
b can gain from participating. Thus !b = 0 cannot be the equilibrium. Similarly, ga(1;sb) < 0
and gb(1;sb) = 0 implies !a < 1 in equilibrium. Lemma 2 guarantees that both !a and !b are
interior solutions. Both traders need to be indi®erent between participating or not, that is,
ga(!a;!b) = 0 and gb(!a;!b) = 0. The monotonicity of the ga and gb functions ensures the
existence of a solution in this case. Finally, to prove that !a ¸ !b, we assume by contradiction
that !a < !b. Then 0 = ga(!a;!b) > ga(!a;!a) > gb(!a;!a) > gb(!a;!b) = 0, yielding a
34contradiction. Note that the ¯rst inequality is because ga(!a;!b) increases in !b, and the last
is because gb(!a;!b) decreases in !b. The middle inequality is because of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
We substitute in the participation and market equilibrium from Propositions 1 and 3 and
integrate over X to derive the unconditional value function J
L and J
NL in (23) and (24).
Hence, the ex-ante value function Ji(¢) in (25) is well de¯ned for all traders. Moreover, the
utility conditional on X for the market maker is the same as JP(¸i = 0) except for his initial
holding µm
t and cost cm = 0:
J
m
P (X) = ¡
1
p

















Integrating over X then yields the ex-ante utility Jm(¢) = E[Jm
P (X)].
With the market clearing condition (27), stationarity condition (28), and three ¯rst-order
conditions in (30), we have ¯ve equations and ¯ve unknowns (µa
t;µb
t;µm
t ;Pt;Pt+1). A solution
to the system gives a full equilibrium of the economy.
Proof of Theorem 1
When traders face no idiosyncratic shocks, that is, ¸ = 0, it is easy to show that traders
never participate whenever ci > 0, that is, !i = 0 8 i = a;b. The equilibrium prices are
determined by market makers as representative agents, and are identical to those derived
in (12). Equilibrium holdings of the stock for all agents are always equal to the per capita
supply ¹ µ.
Proposition 4 describes conditions for an equilibrium. The ex-ante symmetry between
the two groups of traders implies that Ja = Jb and µa
t = µb
t. For simplicity, we use index i
to denote traders a or b. Substituting in the stationarity condition (Pt+1 = Pt) directly, we
are left with three variables to solve for the equilibrium fPt;µi
t;µm
t g from three equilibrium
conditions: two ¯rst-order conditions (30) for agents i and m, respectively, and one market
clearing condition (27).
For small ¸, we expand the solution to equilibrium in ¸ to the ¯rst order:
Pt = ¹ P + P¸¸ + o(¸) (A10a)
µ
i
t = ¹ µ + µ
i
¸¸ + o(¸) (A10b)
µ
m
t = ¹ µ + µ
m
¸ ¸ + o(¸); (A10c)
35where ¹ P is de¯ned in (12) and o(¸) denotes terms of higher order of ¸. We then solve the
equilibrium up to the ¯rst order of ¸.
Given (A10), we solve ± and ^ µ to the ¯rst order of ¸. Note that both ¹¾z=(¹ + ¸º) and




¸ ) is of order O(¸), where
O(¢) denotes terms of the same order. Condition (20) is satis¯ed when ¸ is small (i.e., to










(k¹ µ + ¸
iX)
2 + O(¸):
Thus, trader i participates i® gi(¢) > 0, which occurs i® X > Xi












2(1 ¡ k)[2®ciRF + ln(1 ¡ k)]; if 2®ciRF + ln(1¡k) ¸ 0
0; if 2®ciRF + ln(1¡k) ¸ 0:
Since ± and ^ µ depends on !i only through term ¸!i, we can ignore all O(¸) terms for the
calculation of !i. The equilibrium participation in Proposition 3 can be simpli¯ed to
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
!a = !b = 1; ± = 0; if X · ¡k ¹ µ ¡ h
!a = 0; !b = 1; ± = ¡¹ ±; if ¡k ¹ µ ¡ h < X · ¡jk ¹ µ ¡ hj
!a = !b = 1; ± = 0; if ¡jk ¹ µ ¡ hj < X · jk ¹ µ ¡ hj and k ¹ µ > h
!a = !b = 0; ± = 0; if ¡jk ¹ µ ¡ hj < X · jk ¹ µ ¡ hj and k ¹ µ < h
!a = 1; !b = 0; ± = ¹ ±; if jk ¹ µ ¡ hj < X < k ¹ µ + h
!a = !b = 1; ± = 0; if X ¸ k ¹ µ + h.
(A11)















¸ + o(¸) = ¹ µ + µ
m
¸ ¸ + o(¸): (A12b)
Using (A10) and (A12) and the de¯nition of ¹ P in (12), the ¯rst-order condition for market
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u. Since h1 · h2, we know that c1 ¸ 0.
We now consider the ¯rst-order condition for trader i. First, we verify that traders with





i = 0;X; ^ µ;±)]; (A14)
where E[¢] is taken with respect to X. Given (A10) and (A12) and the fact that µi
t ¡ ^ µ and ±
are both of the order O(¸), we have
gNL(µ
i
t;µ) = O(¸) ¡ RFc
i;
which is negative as long as ci is ¯nite and ¸ is small enough. Thus, J
NL = E[JNP(¸i = 0)].
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where JP and JNP are de¯ned in (A5) and (A6), and g(¢) is the trading gain in (17). The ¯rst
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37where ¹ k = 1
2®2¾2
D¾2
z captures the total uncertainty in idiosyncratic shocks. Since JP = JNP
when g(¢) = 0, for the second term in (A15), we have
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D (k ¹ µ + X)
2(1 ¡ k)3=2 e
®2¾2
D
4(1¡k)(k ¹ µ2+2¹ µX+X2)¸ + o(¸)
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4) · 0 (since h3 · h4.) Since h ¸ 0, and c3 = 1






































¸ + c2(1 ¡ c3) = 0: (A16)
Finally, the market clearing condition (27) reduces to
¹µ
m
¸ + 2º µ
i
¸ = 0: (A17)
Solving system (A13), (A16), and (A17), we derive the linear stationary equilibrium
P¸ = ¡






2¹[c1 ¡ c2(1 ¡ c3)]
®¾2





4º [c1 ¡ c2(1 ¡ c3)]
®¾2
D (¹ + 2º)
: (A18c)
Since c1 ¸ 0, c2 ¸ 0, and c3 · 1, P¸ is always negative.
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